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ABSTRACT
The article presents three main arguments in favour of an interdisciplinary opening of international law. The first emerges 
from the transition from traditional international law to transnational law, as a result of which specialized legal subsys-
tems increasingly overcome the boundaries of nation states and, by making themselves independent of the pyramidal 
structure of the constitutional order, tend to overlap one another. Consequently, the transnational sphere is characterized 
by a significant intersection of competences, so that contemporary international law cannot be understood properly with-
out a substantial expertise in fields that transcend its usual understanding. The second argument in favour of interdisci-
plinarity is related to the content of law in general and of international law in particular. Because a set of norms fulfils the 
task of stabilizing the normative expectations that are generated within a specific social subsystem, it inevitably incorpo-
rates the kind of rationality that characterizes the functioning of that same social subsystem. Thus, to understand how a 
legal subsystem works, it is necessary to take into account the fundamental constituents of that kind of rationality which 
makes up the rules of interaction within the social subsystem related to that particular set of norms. The third argument 
for interdisciplinarity derives, finally, from the overall rationale of law. In fact, beyond the functional rationality that the 
legal norms acquire insofar as they fulfil the task of stabilizing the normative expectations generated within specialized 
social subsystems, the law also enshrines a more inclusive understanding of a metasystemic rationality, namely a com-
prehensive idea of social order. Therefore, law is to be interpreted as the system of formal propositions that lay down the 
rules and principles that govern human interaction according to a specific view of how the “well-ordered society” should 
be defined. While law’s relation to the specialized subsystems is the expression of its functional rationale, its link to the 
idea of how the “well-ordered society” is understood manifests its more encompassing social rationality and, by reflect-
ing what we can define as the paradigms of order, incorporates the knowledge developed within extra-legal discourses. 
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International Law and Interdisciplinarity 
 
 





1. Three Reasons for Interdisciplinarity 
 
Presently, almost all disciplines are caught in a curious contradiction. On the one hand, their lan-
guages have become increasingly specialistic, making each of them into an exclusive field for ex-
perts, thus excluding even well-educated laymen from participating in the discourse. On the other 
hand, the reference to interdisciplinarity has surged to the status of a kind of mantra, bearing the 
traits of a conditio sine qua non for academic recognition and research funding. International law 
is no exception to this rule. Only a couple of decades ago, its corpus juris was essentially made of a 
manageable number of inter-state treaties, whose validity was limited to the signing parties. This 
corpus of inter-state legal agreements was completed through an essential body of norms – to be 
led back, initially, to natural law, and later laid down in written covenants and treaties – which was 
assumed to have a worldwide and almost all-encompassing validity. In recent years, however, 
some new phenomena have triggered a significant increase in complexity. Among them were – 
just to make a few examples – the fragmentation of international law into distinct legal subsys-
tems, the establishment of an impressive number of international courts, the creation of a system 
of global governance through international organizations, the emergence of global administrative 
law, the strengthening of private international law and the involvement of powerful private actors 
as subjects of international agreements, as well as, finally, the introduction of new categories of 
norms, such as the codes of conduct. We can generally assume that a society, to perform its tasks, 
has to differentiate itself into specialized social subsystems and that each social subsystem tends 
to increase the specificity of its own flow of internal information on the basis of its idiosyncratic 
rationality in order to implement its social function properly. Consequently, the language of each 
legal subsystem – which itself is a social subsystem – becomes more and more the matter for high-
ly trained professionals. Teaching international law, therefore, must comprise specialized courses 
in which the language of the legal discipline (or disciplines) is properly introduced and the students 
are trained in the use of its (or their) instruments. 
Nonetheless, the other side – namely the side of interdisciplinarity – should not be neglected 
either, both in research and teaching. There are three main arguments that speak in favour of an 
interdisciplinary opening of international law: the first deals with a change in international law’s 
scope which occurred in the last decades, the second with the content of law in general and of in-
ternational law in particular, and the third with the overall rationale of law. Starting with the first 
argument, it should be kept in mind that traditional international law has been, for a long time, ei-
ther a law between states or a law that aspired to supersede nation states. Yet, in both cases it 
was assumed to maintain the internal unity and coherence of the legal system, regardless of 
whether the system whose unity had to be preserved was referred to national law, to internation-
al law, or to some kind of cosmopolitan law. With the transition from traditional international law 
                                                          
*  Professor of Public Law and State Theory at the University of Turin (Italy), Department of Law; senior research 
affiliate of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg (Germany); 
email: sergio.dellavalle@unito.it; dellavalle.affiliate@mpil.de. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3590269
 
2 MPIL Research Paper Series No. 2020-14 
to transnational law – as a result of two driving forces, namely globalization and the inherent ten-
dency of national social subsystems to expand beyond the borders of the state – we are confront-
ed, for the first time in modern Western history, with specialized legal systems that, by overcom-
ing the boundaries of nation states and by making themselves independent of the pyramidal struc-
ture of the constitutional order, increasingly tend to overlap one another. In the transnational 
sphere, therefore, we essentially have a significant intersection of competences, so that interna-
tional lawyers cannot do their job appropriately without having a substantial expertise in fields 
that transcend the usual understanding of international law, such as constitutional law, adminis-
trative law, cyberlaw, investment law, law of the financial markets, and so on. 
After having highlighted, in Section 2, some aspects of the emergence of transnational law 
and the increase in interdisciplinarity triggered by this new development, Section 3 will focus on 
the content of law as a driving force of a parallel strengthening of interdisciplinarity. At this point, 
our gaze extends from international law to law in general. Indeed, it is the analysis of the content 
of any kind of law that requires an interdisciplinary approach. This becomes evident if we consider 
both the achievements and the failures of that strand of legal theory which, like no other, advo-
cates the independence and self-reliance of the law as a system, thus explicitly rejecting any re-
course to interdisciplinarity, namely legal positivism. Regardless of the different accents highlight-
ed by its exponents, legal positivism always focused on the formal requisites for a sentence to be 
justifiably considered a legal norm. Yet, legal propositions are not only characterized by a specific 
form but also by a content that is expected to be properly channelled by those formal require-
ments and is ultimately based on a specific dimension of the social function of the law. In other 
words, inasmuch as a set of norms fulfils the task of stabilizing the normative expectations that are 
generated within the social subsystems,1 it inevitably incorporates the kind of rationality that 
characterizes the functioning of that same subsystem.2 As a result, if we want to understand how 
a legal subsystem works, we have to take into due account the fundamental constituents of that 
kind of rationality which makes up the rules of interaction within the social subsystem related to 
that particular set of norms. In plain words, this means – for instance – that teaching law and arti-
ficial intelligence or cyberlaw cannot refrain from giving sufficient information about what artificial 
intelligence is or about how information technology operates. In the same vein, human rights law 
is not only about the formal principles and rules that are thought to protect the fundamental enti-
tlements of human beings but also presupposes a sufficiently sophisticated awareness of the ways 
in which those entitlements are justified as well as of which claims are arguably to be regarded as 
binding human rights. Only this way can the interpretation of the existing norms as well as their 
further development be properly substantiated. 
Yet, the rationality of the law – regardless of whether in its general meaning or, more specif-
ically, as international law – cannot only be limited to its functional dimension. Indeed, beyond the 
functional rationality that the legal norms acquire insofar as they fulfil the task of stabilizing the 
normative expectations generated within specialized social subsystems, the law also expresses 
and enshrines a more inclusive understanding of a metasystemic rationality, namely a comprehen-
sive idea of social order. In other words, law is to be interpreted, too, as the system of formal 
propositions that lay down the rules and principles that govern human interaction according to a 
specific view of how the “well-ordered society” should be defined. While law’s relation to the spe-
                                                          
1  Niklas Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1993, at 125 et seq. (English: Law as a 
Social System, Fatima Kastner et al. eds., Oxford University Press, Oxford/London 2004, at 142 et seq.). 
2  Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Gunther Teubner, Regime Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmenta-
tion of Global Law, in: 25 Michigan Journal of International Law (2003–2004) 999–1046, at 1004 et seq. 
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cialized subsystems is the expression of its functional rationale, its link to the idea of how the 
“well-ordered society” is understood manifests its more encompassing social rationality. However, 
if we try to define what the “well-ordered society” is, we will easily find out that it cannot be lim-
ited either to inner-state interactions or to inter-state relations. Rather, it covers both the national 
and the international dimensions at the same time, so that studying and teaching international 
law from the perspective of a comprehensive idea of social order must include references to tradi-
tional issues of constitutional and administrative law. Furthermore, an encompassing idea of social 
order entails assumptions with reference to both public and private law, as well as to their rela-
tion. As a result, the disciplines of public and private international law cannot be kept separated as 
they were assumed to be following the traditional doctrine, but have rather to be analysed in their 
mutual balance and interactions. For instance, private actors can supposedly shape global social 
order in a way that refrains from the usual resort to public law, thus undertaking tasks traditionally 
allocated to public power. Accordingly, research and teaching must consider whether goals usually 
referred to common interests can be properly accomplished by private law systems, or whether 
the “well-ordered society” necessarily needs, on the contrary, public power institutions to foster 
what the civic debate comes to define as shared purposes. Finally – and most importantly – if the 
law is to be understood as the formal expression of a certain idea of social order, then those disci-
plines should be taken into consideration, such as political philosophy as well as social and political 
sciences, which have the specific task of highlighting the main features of the fundamental pat-
terns of order. Basically, insofar as the different forms of legal order – to be better understood – 
are to be connected with general and distinct paradigms of social order, we can perform this op-
eration in the best way by resorting to the intellectual instruments and to the knowledge put at 
disposal by fields of study other than the law. The connection and interdependence between the 
law and the general paradigms of social order – together with the advantages for research and 
teaching that can be drawn from them – are addressed in Section 4. A short conclusion – in Sec-




2. Interdisciplinarity and the Change in International Law’s Scope 
 
The first reference to interdisciplinarity in international law refers to a deep-going reshape of its 
scope. Until only a few decades ago, international law was essentially seen – as advocated by the 
exponents of dualism – as a system of norms, beside domestic law, to regulate the interactions be-
tween nation states, or, according to the rather marginal monist approach, as the normative dome 
located above domestic law and due to encompass the worldwide domain of human behaviour 
with the aim to guarantee universal peace (2.1.). With the emergence of transnational law, the le-
gal order beyond nation states profoundly changed its form and field of application. In particular, 
legal systems which had developed within the national domain and under the rule of constitution-
al public power expanded beyond the boundaries of individual states, broke the former domi-
nance of domestic public law and created a new landscape of specialized and globalized regimes 
tending to overlap with one another (2.2.). Against this background, different dimensions or vari-
ants of transnational law have been outlined, including legal pluralism, the regimes of globalized 
markets, international public authority and global constitutionalism (2.3.). Within the context of 
transnational law, the coexistence of overlapping legal regimes, with no established normative 
priority accorded to anyone of them, not only generates frequent conflicts but makes them also 
difficult to resolve by traditional means. In fact, the new constellation renders it impossible to re-
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sort to the old-fashioned strategy of conflict solution, based on a generally recognized hierarchy of 
norms and institutions. Since this instrument is unavailable, unprecedented forms of conflict man-
agement have been introduced and successfully pioneered (2.4.). 
 
 
2.1. Monism and Dualism 
 
Historically, the relationship of national and international law has been interpreted along the line 
of the dichotomy between two powerful narrations: dualism and monism. Dualism – by far the 
approach with the most supporters – maintains that domestic and international law are two dis-
tinct legal systems, which apply to different and largely incommensurable fields of social interac-
tion. The most striking argument in favour of dualism consists in the evidence of conflicts between 
the two systems of norms. For instance, if a state issues a law that contrasts with international 
norms, this law is ordinarily assumed to be valid despite the violation. In his defence of monism, 
Hans Kelsen dismissed the argument by establishing a similarity between this case and a domestic 
situation in which a constitutional order does not provide for a mechanism to abolish an unconsti-
tutional statute: the statute remains valid, although no doubt can be raised that it has been illegal-
ly issued. Even, “certain organs may be tried in court personally for their part in the establishment 
of the ‘unconstitutional’ statute.”3 Analogously, it may be true that a national law that runs 
against international norms is nonetheless to be considered valid within the domestic order; yet, it 
is illegal, and international institutions are justifiably required to create a mechanism to abolish it 
and to make accountable those responsible for the violation. On the opposite side of dualism, H. L. 
A. Hart criticized Kelsen’s analysis not primarily because of logical inconsistency, excessive abstrac-
tion or lack of evidence, but rather because of a fundamental assumption regarding the validity of 
law. Indeed, while from the monist point of view law has essentially only one fundament, dualists 
assume that the fundaments are two: domestic law is grounded on the constitutional order, and 
international law is based on the agreements between states.4 
On the opposite side, monism generally assumes that the whole worldwide legal system – in 
all its international and domestic implementations – has to be considered as a normative unity. 
The logical consequence of this assumption is that international law, as the most inclusive compo-
nent of the cosmopolitan legal system, should be granted superiority over every kind of domestic 
law, be it constitutional or statutory. At this point, it is worth being noticed that Kelsen himself – 
undoubtedly the most powerful defender of monism – gave two quite significantly different justi-
fications of why the worldwide system of laws should be regarded as a unity with international law 
at its apex. The most radical interpretation can be found in the first German edition of his Reine 
Rechtslehre (Pure Theory of Law) of 1934, in which no validation of the superiority of international 
law by the sovereign state is required. Rather, it is international law itself, as the most inclusive le-
gal order, that specifies the range of competences on which the individual state can legally legis-
late. Indeed – Kelsen argued – a contradiction would arise if we had to admit that the priority of 
international law should be sanctioned by the domestic constitutional organs. Since we have a 
large number of individual states, if international law were depending for the specification of its 
                                                          
3  Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik, Deuticke, Leipzig/Wien 
1934 (Pure Theory of Law, English translation from the Second German Edition of 1960 by Max Knight, University 
of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1967, at 331). 
4  H. L. A. Hart, Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law, in: H. L. A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Clar-
endon, Oxford 1983, 309–342. 
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normative range on sovereign decisions taken by each of those single states, then we would also 
have as many different international law systems as we have sovereign states – with the conse-
quence that no binding law beyond the domestic context would exist. No less incongruous is the 
circumstance that, given that international law provides for the mutual recognition of states as 
equal actors in the international arena, exactly this mutual acknowledgment, which is fundamen-
tal for the very functioning of the international system, would have to rely upon the free and arbi-
trary will of each individual state. The result would be that the recognition of every state as equal 
actor of international law would lie in the hands of every other single state, as well as that each 
individual state would decide on the international recognition of all other states.5 The confusing 
consequences that would be generated by such an assumption are hardly contestable – and thus 
Kelsen’s radical solution seems to be, indeed, the most rational outcome. Nonetheless, in the sec-
ond edition of 1960 – which is better known to the English-speaking readers due to its translation 
of 1967 – he considerably watered down his position, probably in order to make his theory more 
realistic and acceptable by taking into due account that, as a matter of fact, international law is 
created by sovereign states. According to the later interpretation, it is ultimately secondary – if not 
from the conceptual point of view, at least with reference to the results – whether the obligations 
that derive from international law are validated by the individual states, or international law itself 
is self-validating. Either assumption guarantees, first, that international law “determines … the 
reason and sphere of validity of the national legal order,”6 thus ensuring a paramount hierarchical 
position to the supra-state order, and, secondly, that the whole legal system has a monist charac-
ter. 
From a positivistic perspective, the difference between monism and dualism essentially con-
sists in whether international treaties are directly applicable by domestic courts. Indeed, according 
to the monist understanding, international law has immediate validity within the national legal or-
der without any intervention by national constitutional organs – more specifically, by the legisla-
ture. On the contrary, in monist systems international treaties – to be recognized as valid law of 
the country and to be applicable by domestic courts – must be transposed into the domestic legal 
system by a parliamentary act. This distinction, which seems to be clear and evident at first sight, 
blurs if faced with a more deep-going analysis. In fact, most countries – at least in the Western 
world – combine some aspects of monism (for example, the possibility of an immediate reference 
by domestic courts to international law as a valid law of the country) with features deriving from a 
dualist interpretation of the legal system (for instance, the introduction of some kind of interven-
tion by a legislative organ in order to grant an overall internal validity to the treaty, or the differen-
tiation between some parts of international law, which do not need any intervention by the do-
mestic legislature, and others which require them to be regarded as valid). Ultimately, most coun-
tries seem to have adopted, from a formal point of view, a mixture of monist and dualist attrib-
utes.  
Yet, what Kelsen and Hart hint at in their contributions is not the formalistic difference be-
tween procedures of validation, but something more profound, namely the contraposition of two 
opposite views as regards the foundation of the legitimacy of law. Following Kelsen’s monism, the 
ultimate legitimacy of the law lies in the most inclusive legal community. In front of this funda-
mental assumption, it is substantially marginal – even if not formally irrelevant – whether rules 
and principles that govern this most inclusive legal community of international law are immediate-
ly self-executing or whether a parliamentary act is necessary to insert them into the domestic legal 
                                                          
5  Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, supra n. 3, at 142 et seq. 
6  Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, supra n. 3, at 340. 
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order. In fact, by binding it to international norms, even the parliamentary act simply acknowledg-
es that no proper legitimacy of public power is given without taking into account the interrelations 
within the worldwide community of states, peoples and individuals. Furthermore, since the indi-
vidual state is unquestionably part of this international community, the parliamentary act that 
binds the individual state to international law is normatively due and factually realistic. On the 
contrary, Hart lays the fundament of the legitimacy of the individual legal community in the norms 
and procedures of every single state.7 According to his view, the direct or self-committed obliga-
tion towards international law is no necessary condition for a full-fledged internal legitimacy. Go-
ing a step beyond what Hart explicitly claims, but arguably not unduly forcing his thought, since it 
is the internal order that factually creates international law and guarantees its effectiveness, and 
not vice versa, the legitimacy of international law is based on the free decisions of the single 
states, while the legitimacy of the domestic legal order does not depend on the recognition of the 
normative superiority of international law. Therefore, the contraposition between Kelsen’s mon-
ism and Hart’s dualism basically moves along the line of the distinction between universalism and 
particularism as the fundamental categories related to the extension of social, political and legal 
order. This distinction will be further analysed while discussing the relationship between the inter-
disciplinarity of international law and law’s overall social rationale.8  
Despite their much-discussed opposition, monism and dualism nonetheless share a funda-
mental assumption, namely that it is not acceptable that two not hierarchically related norms, 
which derive from two independent legal systems, are both valid if applied at the same time to the 
same matter. This assumption is quite evident in the monist context: indeed, if all legal norms are 
worldwide part of a unitary pyramidal system, every conflict that may arise between them can ar-
guably be brought to a solution by clarifying their respective position within the overall hierarchy. 
In the end, this is the reason why, from the monist perspective, normative conflict is always an ill-
ness which, however, can in any event be cured. The question is more complicated from the dual-
ist point of view: here, it is doubtlessly accepted that norms can be trapped in a conflict which 
cannot find a solution within a shared hierarchy. More specifically, Hart explicitly admitted that in-
ternational law can contrast with domestic law.9 Since the two systems are independent of one 
another, the way out of the conflict consists, in this case, in giving up on the idea of a common le-
gal order and in identifying to which legal order the norms in question respectively and primarily 
belong. In other words, if they both belong to the domestic – or to the international – order, their 
conflict can be resolved by resorting to the hierarchy of their system of reference. But, if they be-
long to two different systems, we have to understand which rule of recognition applies to which 
norm, to that each of them can be led back to its context and be interpreted accordingly. Ulti-
mately, in both monism and dualism no normative conflict is irresolvable – and in both of them 
the main instrument for conflict solution is the resort to hierarchy – simply because no overlap-
ping of legal systems is assumed to exist as a non-pathological condition. It is precisely on this 




2.2. What is Transnational Law? 
 
                                                          
7  Hart, Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law, supra n. 4, at 317 et seq. 
8  See infra, Section 4. 
9  Hart, Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law, supra n. 4, at 324 et seq. 
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The definition of transnational law is highly contested – and there are even scholars who deny that 
there is something like transnational law. For instance, Franz Werro expresses doubts that a body 
of norms can be singled out with so unique features that the creation of a specific concept would 
be justified. Rather, transnational law would identify a method to approach some legal develop-
ments beyond the nation state with quite diverse and non-systemic characteristics. In contrast to 
international law, these norms do not build a consistent corpus juris; nonetheless, they cannot be 
led back to the domestic legal order either. Therefore, what methodologically distinguishes the 
discipline of transnational law studies – and not of transnational law as a legal system – is that, 
first, the analytic view must concentrate neither on domestic law nor on traditional international 
law, but on the space between them, and, secondly, that lawyers must rely on non-legal compe-
tences in order to understand the specific rationality of the most recent developments in their 
field of expertise.10 Here we have the first hint to the necessity to take interdisciplinarity seriously 
while studying contemporary non-domestic law, more specifically with reference to the inevitable 
relation between law’s contents and extra-legal knowledge. I will come back to this point in the 
next Section. Returning, now, to the possible meaning of transnational law, Werro’s low-profile 
preference had been already voiced, a couple of years before and in an even more radical form, by 
Claudio Grossman. In his view, “transnationalization” means nothing more than the advisable 
opening up of legal education, within the programs of law schools and as a result of the globaliza-
tion process, to both international law – which is quite not obvious, in particular in the US system 
– and to foreign legal traditions.11 Finally, the turn to transnationalism in legal practice and studies 
has been accused of being nothing else than an instrument created – during the “decade of 
greed”, namely the 1990s – by hegemonic Western states and companies to foster the interests of 
the few and to the detriment of the many.12 
To find an unapologetically positive assessment of transnational law in both its dimensions – 
namely, first, as a method to understand recent legal phenomena which, secondly, led to the es-
tablishment of a body of laws with unique features – it seems to be necessary to go back as far as 
to the first author who introduced the concept, i.e. to Philip C. Jessup. According to his definition, 
transnational law includes “all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national fron-
tiers.”13 Going more into detail, it comprises “both public and private international law …, as … 
other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.”14 On a more philosophical note, 
Jessup specifies that “in spite of the vast organizational and procedural differences between the 
national and the international stage, … there are common elements in the domestic and the inter-
national drama”, that are lastly rooted in “merely human problems which might arise at any level 
of human society.”15 Put this way, transnational law appears to be the quintessential realization of 
a system of norms for the whole humankind and for the protection of its shared interests. Apart 
from Jessup’s overtly optimistic tone, the question remains as to what the novelty of transnational 
                                                          
10  Franz Werro, Is There Such a Thing as Transnational Law? Suggestions for defining the Object of Transnational 
Legal Studies, in: Marc Amstuzt, Stefan Keller, Stefan Wiprächtiger (eds.), Recht zwischen Dogmatik und Theorie, 
Dike/Nomos, St.Gallen/Baden-Baden 2012, 311–328. 
11  Claudio Grossman, Building the World Community through Legal Education, in: Jan Klabbers, Mortimer Sellers 
(eds.), The Internationalization of Law and Legal Education, Springer, Dordrecht 2008, 21–35. 
12  M. Sornarajah, Why “No” to Transnational Legal Studies, in: Cornelia T. L. Pillard et al., Why Transnational Legal 
Education, Center for Transnational Legal Studies, London, 20–25, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/ctls/wp-
content/uploads/sites/33/2018/01/CTLS-Why-Transnational-Education.pdf (accessed on the 2nd of January 
2020). 
13  Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law, Yale University Press, New Haven 1956, at 2. 
14  Ibid. 
15  Ibid., at 15 et seq. 
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law really consists of. Frankly, this novelty cannot be sought in its universalistic scope since inter-
national law itself no less emphatically claims – at least in its monist understanding – to be the sys-
tem of rules for the whole humanity. Nor is the opening up of the law beyond the nation states to 
new subjects like individuals, private companies, NGOs, and so on, really something unprecedent-
ed, as can be proved by having a look at the most recent and post-traditional handbooks of oth-
erwise quite traditionally defined international law. Moreover, transnational law is not the first 
system to overcome the principle of state consent by giving, in some cases, higher and normative-
ly binding authority to supra-state institutions: indeed, the same outcome has already been advo-
cated by the most uncompromising versions of monism. Finally, also the coexistence of private 
and public law in the domain beyond the nation states – far from being something unheard of – is 
a generally accepted component of the discipline of international law. Therefore, once having no-
ticed that none of these elements accounts for the novelty of transnational law, we definitely have 
to look at something different to find a convincing answer to the questions of what the notion 
stands for and why its use can be reasonably regarded as a heuristic step forward. 
By adopting a new theoretical perspective, we can see transnational law as the result – un-
precedented indeed – of the processes of disaggregation that affected the nation states following 
globalization. According to the point of view of the contemporary neo-liberal theory of interna-
tional law and relations, the individual state should never be seen as a “billiard ball”, but rather as 
a conjunction of different social groups with distinct interests and priorities.16 As soon as the grip 
of the central public power loosened as a consequence of the international economic interconnec-
tions that increasingly built up starting in the last decades of the last century, the public and pri-
vate components of the domestic fabric found themselves empowered as new actors of the inter-
national arena. On the other hand, as pointed out by systems theory, the domestic social and legal 
subsystems always possess an inherent tendency to become independent from central regulation 
and to grow globally in order to properly implement their specific functional rationality.17 In other 
words, the larger the field of implementation of every single social subsystem is, the likelier it is 
for each of them – as the doctrine of the economy of scale teaches us – to perform its specific so-
cial function in the most rational and successful way.  Regardless of which theoretical approach we 
may prefer – neo-liberalism or systems theory – the outcome is largely the same: recently, we 
have seen domestic social subsystems – politics, administration, economy, financial sector, and 
many others – become self-reliant actors in the space beyond nation states. Since the activities of 
these social subsystems generally need to be regulated by law, also the legal subsystems respec-
tively related to them have gone global. For instance, administrative law has become global ad-
ministrative law, constitutional law has become global constitutionalism, and so on. This is pre-
cisely the field where transnational law as a new phenomenon in the world of law can be located 
and conceptually identified. Thus, from this point of view, transnational law is the non-unitary cor-
pus juris made of different legal subsystems which, originally located in the domestic sphere, over-
came the boundaries of the nation state as a result of globalization. It is almost superfluous to un-
derline that, understood this way, transnational law is indeed something different from traditional 
international law: while the latter is the law between states or the law of the global civitas maxi-
                                                          
16  Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 International Or-
ganization 513 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, Princeton University Press, Princeton/Oxford 
2004, at 12 et seq. 
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ma, the former is the law of the specialized legal subsystems beyond the nation states. More spe-
cifically, transnational law overcomes both monism and dualism. It overcomes monism because it 
does not maintain that law, to be consistent, has to form a unitary and hierarchical system, but 
presupposes that law is made of different interacting systems. On the other hand, transnational 
law also overcomes dualism because it does not identify two clearly separate legal systems, but a 
plurality of overlapping systems.  
Yet, there is a second, no less important distinction between international and transnational 
law. Since the domestic control and the strive for normative consistency that was guaranteed by 
the nation states have not been replaced by any comparable or even just functionally equivalent 
mechanism, the specialized legal subsystems that have become self-reliant tend to overlap with 
one another. Therefore, we have here, as a condition of normality, what was generally assumed to 
be a dangerous illness of the whole system of laws, namely the contemporary validity of two dis-
tinct and even contradictory norms, which originate from two different sources, but are applied to 
the same matter. Put this way, transnational law is the field of unprecedented horizontal conflicts, 
the solution of which requires a high-profile intellectual creativity. We can find here a robust justi-
fication for the interdisciplinary turn in studying and teaching non-domestic law: insofar as this is 
now made of a mixture of traditional norms of international law with regulations that were typical 
for specialized domestic legal systems and are now applied beyond the national domain, legal pro-
fessionals and experts of post-domestic law must not only be well-versed in the conventional in-
ternational law doctrine but also possess adequate knowledge of the other fields of law. Inevita-
bly, international law must be studied and taught in combination with constitutional law, with 
administrative law, with law and finance, with economic law, with private law, and so on. Inas-
much as such a huge task is almost impossible to be undertaken by a single person or course, the 
teaching of international law must be split into specialized classes. 
 
 
2.3. Facets of Transnational Law 
 
Transnational law is a quite diverse and multifaceted phenomenon, so that its representation 
takes different shapes, depending on which aspect prevails. Basically, we have four versions of 
what transnational law is essentially assumed to be.  
 
2.3.1. Legal Pluralism 
The main novelty introduced by transnational law – and, thus, also the most innovative label that 
has been used to describe it – is legal pluralism. The novelty introduced by the approach of legal 
pluralism into legal theory is underlined by Nico Krisch. In his passionate and eloquent plea, plural-
ism is presented as a “break”,18 thus – in epistemological terms – as a paradigmatic revolution 
which overcomes the old-fashioned idea of the unity of the legal system,19 paving the way to the 
acknowledgement of diversity.20 National constitutionalism is criticized because it “not only fails 
to include but also fails to deliver.”21 As regards the first issue, “domestic constitutionalism, which 
places the national community at the centre of the legal and political universe […] cannot reflect 
[the] broader constituency” that “goes well beyond the national community”: therefore, “on 
                                                          
18  Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 2010, at 16, 23 and 68. 
19  Ibid., at 305. 
20  Ibid., at 303. 
21  Ibid., at 21. 
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transboundary issues, it remains underinclusive.”22 And, referring to the second point, “domestic 
constitutionalism […] would require us to withdraw from, rather than extend, effective postna-
tional decision-making structures in order to safeguard control by domestic political processes.”23 
Yet, the criticism is broadened to comprehend cosmopolitan or postnational constitutionalism as 
well, insofar as it is accused “to provide continuity with the domestic constitutionalist tradition by 
construing an overarching legal framework that determines the relationships of the different lev-
els of law and the distribution of power among their institutions.”24 On contrast, pluralism is 
adaptable and enables us to adopt a highly flexible system of checks and balances which can fit in-
to the postnational legal system with its heterarchical character.25 Last but not least, legal plural-
ism not only defines a theoretical instrument able to describe the present state of the art but also 
depicts what can be regarded as a normatively attractive perspective.26 
By welcoming the coexistence of distinct and non-hierarchically connected legal systems in a 
sphere that comprises the domestic as well as the international domain, the theory of legal plural-
ism also acknowledges that these postnational legal systems interact and even overlap with one 
another. More concretely, “using pluralism, we can conceive of a legal system as both autono-
mous and permeable; outside norms (both state and nonstate) affect the system but do not domi-
nate it fully.”27 This creates a new phenomenon, which Paul Schiff Berman defines as “jurisdiction-
al hybridity”,28 i.e. a plurality of normative spaces in which norms from different sources – all 
claiming to be valid and applicable at the same time and to the same cases – contend with one 
another for priority. Within the context of jurisdictional hybridity, no resort to hierarchy is possible 
in order to clarify the respective rank of norms, so that the outcome must be seen as the always 
contestable result of an open-end exchange of arguments. Berman refers to four examples of the 
phenomenon, the first of which are the “state versus state conflicts of norms”.29 Unlike the tradi-
tional jurisdictional disputes between states, contemporary inter-state conflicts – due to globaliza-
tion and to the development of the cyberspace – have a much broader and more deep-going mu-
tual impact on internal forms of interaction and regulation. The problems related to the territorial 
reach of free speech regulations – as shown by the cases referring to the removal of contents from 
the internet – demonstrate that solutions cannot easily be found by drawing boundaries between 
legal systems, but require an innovative approach that mutually takes into due account the posi-
tion of the counterpart. The second example is the “state versus international conflicts of norms”, 
where the international dimension – as in the case of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or, 
even more, of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) scheme – is understood in a way that 
“may have impact on various entities within a nation state”, so that “the international forums can 
provide a source of alternative norms that people then use as leverage in their local settings.”30 
Thirdly, Berman introduces the “nation states versus substate conflicts of norms”, in which ten-
sions between regional unities and the central state – in particular in fields such as environmental 
regulation, foreign affairs and immigration – are characterized by an increasing assertiveness of 
                                                          
22  Ibid. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Ibid., at 23. 
25  Ibid., at 78. 
26  Ibid., at 103. 
27  Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York 2012, at 25. 
28  Ibid., at 23 et seq. 
29  Ibid., at 27 et seq. 
30  Ibid., at 36 et seq. 
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the former, even to the point of bypassing the latter.31 The last form of jurisdictional hybridity re-
ferred to by Berman are the “state versus nonstate conflicts of norms”,32 which seem to blur – ar-
guably for the first time in modern Western legal history – the well-established distinction be-
tween formal laws and non-formal social norms.33 
 
2.3.2. The Legal Regimes of the Globalized Markets 
Of all specialized legal systems that have developed independently of a central regulation, the 
most socially powerful and influential are probably the legal regimes that specify the norms for 
global trade and economic transactions. Two distinct transnational regimes have emerged in this 
field: the first concentrates on the legal framework and on the praxis of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO),34 while the second refers to the normative self-organization of private economic ac-
tors on global scale, i.e. to the so-called new Lex mercatoria.35 What typifies the transnational na-
ture of both regimes is, first, their transfer of regulations that were traditionally under the control 
of domestic law to the space beyond the state; secondly, their mixture of private and public di-
mensions; and, thirdly, their export of concepts that were typical for the domestic discourse – 
more specifically, elements of constitutional language – from the statist to the transnational level. 
As regards the first aspect, the domain of economic transactions and the freedom of initia-
tive that was granted to its agents were traditionally limited by the decisions taken by domestic 
public organs as well as by laws and regulations issued by them, according to the principles that 
public interest must have priority over private preferences and that public interests can be sorted 
out best at the level of the individual political and legal community. Within the context of transna-
tional law, the regulation has either been passed over to an international organization, as in the 
case of the WTO, or it has been left downright to the private actors, insofar as they undertake ac-
tivities that go beyond national borders, as for the Lex mercatoria. With reference to the second 
transnational dimension of the regimes of the globalized markets, the mixture of public and pri-
vate elements takes different forms in the two regimes. Being part of public international law – i.e. 
having been signed by public entities, which are the member states – the WTO has an essentially 
public core. Nevertheless, while the WTO allows, to a certain extent, waivers from the principle of 
free trade, especially “non-discriminatory national regulation of protection of human health, the 
environment, and other public interests,”36 it nonetheless firmly assumes that “international trade 
liberalization tends to increase the economic welfare of every trading nation, e.g. by reducing the 
prices of consumer goods, enhancing productivity through specialization, creating new job oppor-
tunities, and enabling governments to redistribute part of the ‘gains from trade’ for helping the 
poor, assisting workers to shift from import-competing to export sectors of the economy, or pro-
tecting the environment.”37 In the end, the public dimension is largely overruled by the predomi-
nance of private interests, and the incapacity to find a well-balanced solution for the conflict be-
tween private and public might be seen as one of the most relevant reasons for the current crisis 
                                                          
31  Ibid., at 37 et seq. 
32  Ibid., at 41 et seq. 
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of the WTO regime.38 In the case of the Lex mercatoria, the search for a balance between public 
and private went the opposite way. The starting point, here, is undoubtedly private, being located 
in the transnational activities of private agents. However, since the legal system of the spontane-
ous agreements between private actors aims at being self-reliant and independent of any external 
source of authority, it has to incorporate some defining features of public law in order to become 
self-validating, such as the establishment of a hierarchy of norms, the standardization of contracts 
and the creation of a judiciary sui generis in form of arbitration.39 
Finally, as regards the use of constitutional language, this has been introduced into the legal 
regimes of the globalized markets only at the high price of a significant – and highly questionable – 
semantic reduction of the concept of constitution. Indeed, it is quite undisputed that the legal re-
gimes of the globalized markets lack most of the essential contents of a full-fledged notion of con-
stitution, such as a comprehensive bill of rights or the guarantee that the hereby established pow-
er is democratically legitimated. To grant those regimes nevertheless a constitutional rank, it is 
therefore necessary to presuppose an extremely narrow definition of constitution, namely as the 
legal document that contains the rules for the production of secondary norms.40 As a result, con-
stitutional law is understood exclusively in its functional dimension, or, more concretely, as the le-
gal document that (a) enables the production of norms by specifying the procedures which govern 
the issuing of valid rules; (b) restrains this production by clarifying in which fields no rule-making 
should take place; and (c) fills the gaps, in the contexts where rule-making is allowed, which may 
arise from disparate norm-issuing actions at the transnational level, thus guaranteeing sufficient 
homogeneity to the legal regime.41 However, even if we assumed this point of view, some ques-
tions would remain unresolved. Starting with the allegedly constitutional regime of the WTO, its 
most fundamental assumption that the legal documents that lie at the basis of the WTO regime 
take on the role of a functional constitution insofar as they govern the making of secondary rules 
is highly contestable. Indeed, it is not by chance that in many circumstances, due to the lack of 
norms regulating rule-making in the WTO agreements, the tasks of a functional constitutionaliza-
tion – i.e. enabling, constraining and homogenizing rule-making – have been assumed by the Ap-
pellate Body.42 However, while on the one hand the intervention of the Appellate Body has cov-
ered only singular cases, missing therefore the inherently general scope of constitutional rule-
making, on the other hand it could be easily argued that precisely the necessity of this kind of in-
tervention rather proves the absence of a truly constitutional framework. 
With reference to the alleged constitutional character of the new Lex mercatoria – apart 
from any other consideration regarding the deficits of an exclusively functional definition of con-
stitution – it remains controversial whether mechanisms for self-validation are really suitable for 
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the task. Furthermore, insofar as the Lex mercatoria is undergoing a process of codification, ele-
ments are necessarily introduced into its corpus which are derived from national codes of private 
law and through these, due to the usual interconnection of private and public law at national level, 
also from the national systems of public law.43 
 
2.3.3. Global Governance and Public International Authority (IPA) 
While the legal regimes of the globalized markets emphasize the private dimension of the turn to 
transnational law, its third variant highlights precisely the opposite aspect, namely its publicness. 
In other words, transnational law is not only – or not primarily – the expression of the more or less 
spontaneous regulation of private interactions going global but also the way in which shared in-
terests of the worldwide community are identified and protected. The initial assumption, here, is 
that global processes like labor and financial markets, migration, ecological crises, terrorism, orga-
nized crime, technological and scientific innovation, exploitation of natural resources, etc., need to 
be met by establishing executive networks composed of members of national governments and of 
international organizations. In plain words, this means that the world of globalized interactions 
can only address its most urgent challenges by introducing more global governance.44 Transna-
tional governance also triggers the development of what has been defined as “global administra-
tive law”45 which – not unlike the task of administrative law in the domestic realm – establishes at 
the same time the legal framework for the measures that transnational executive organizations 
take in order to guarantee the control of relevant phenomena, and prevents them from overstep-
ping their competences by asserting the principle of the rule of law.46 
Some authors – with Anne-Marie Slaughter as arguably the most prominent amongst them – 
see the transnational law of global governance as a mixture of regulations issued by public agents, 
such as representatives of national governments acting within the context of international organi-
zations,47 and rules emerging from agreements taken by private actors, like those at the basis of 
the Lex mercatoria, whereas the line that should separate the two dimensions is not always clear-
cut.48 Other exponents of this strand, instead, focus unequivocally on the public dimension of 
global governance, which is expressed, in particular, by international public authorities (IPA).49 In 
this case, the “publicness” of the policies that lie at the basis of transnational law is assumed to be 
guaranteed by the fact that IPAs are expected to pursue shared interests and the common good.50 
Here, however, the question arises about the definition of the common good and the ways of its 
realization. Although the theorists of IPA also refer to substantial criteria like freedom or the rule 
of law, the most relevant feature to ensure the ”publicness” of the IPA policies is lastly just formal, 
namely the very fact that IPAs are endowed with a public mandate, derived from public power, to 
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act for the common good.51 Insofar as they do so, the acceptance of their policies by at least the 
majority of individuals and populations involved leads to a sort of output legitimacy, whereas 
hardly any attention is paid to deliberative and democratic procedures of legitimation of interna-
tional organizations. Yet, it has also been argued that scaling down the expectations – by giving up 
on a full-fledged democratic input legitimation, such as the one that is enshrined in domestic 
democratic constitutions, while concentrating on the form of accountability that can be achieved 
through global administrative law – is actually the only affective way to convincingly address the 
legitimacy deficit in the transnational realm.52 
 
2.3.4. Global Constitutionalism 
The fragmentation of the legal framework of transnational law and the limitation of its legitimacy 
claims to the guarantee of an efficient governance or the rule of law – and, therefore, far below 
the usual standards in democratic political systems – are two of its most relevant problems. The 
fourth strand of transnational law – generally known as global or transnational constitutionalism – 
puts their resolution at the top of its agenda. 
As far as the question of legal fragmentation is concerned, global constitutionalism responds 
to the challenge by carrying the promise that “there is something which helps keep the systems 
together.”53 At this point, however, the problem arises on what this “something” could be and 
where it is to be located. Substantially, it can be assumed that this role is to be taken on by a con-
junction of jus cogens, general principles of international law, erga omnes principles and human 
rights,54 as they have been laid down in international treaties – in particular in the UN Charter55, in 
the UN Conventions and in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – as well as in the juris-
prudence of the international courts, most prominently in the ICJ Barcelona Traction judgement of 
1970. Global constitutionalism also builds a fence against an unfettered privatization of the inter-
national sphere “by carving out a protected public realm.”56 However, it is quite evident that the 
elements that should set up the core of global constitutionalism are either customary law – thus, 
anything but formal and generally recognized norms laid down in treaties, in the way in which the 
norms of domestic constitutions are usually understood – or, if they are enshrined in treaties or 
judgements,57 their content is widely subject to diverging interpretation. In this sense, it is un-
doubtable that – as Jan Klabbers puts it – “constitutionalization is an intensely political process.”58 
Consequently, even if we assume, following the premises of global constitutionalism, that “a con-
stitutional world order is one which has a centre of authority,”59 it has nonetheless to be acknowl-
edged that this “authority” is not one issuing binding decisions through top-down processes, but 
one that, while claiming normative superiority, always attempts to make it concrete through hori-
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zontal interactions, open contestation and dialogue. In fact, while hierarchical domestic constitu-
tionalism aims at curbing the plurality of legal systems through the imposition of a centralized le-
gal and institutional structure, global constitutionalism unequivocally recognizes the positive and 
ineliminable value of pluralism. Put differently, pluralism in the international realm is something 
which cannot and should not be reduced to unity, first because such an endeavour would hardly 
be crowned by success, at least currently, and secondly because even if success were possible, it 
would not be desirable due to the values – or to the specific and irreducibly different ideas of the 
“good life” – that are enshrined in national social, political and legal orders. 
“In the absence of a unitary world state – Klabbers maintains – … a constitutional order must 
somehow find ways of dealing with relations between the whole and its parts.”60 Here, the con-
cept of multilevel constitutionalism comes to the aid. Although essentially conceived for an appli-
cation to the constitutional framework of the European Union, it bears some traits that can also be 
highly useful if implemented in the context of transnational law.61 Notoriously, unlike truly federal 
constitutional orders, the legal framework of global constitutionalism might be regarded, in the 
most favourable case, as normatively superior – at least in some fields – to national legal orders, 
but does not enjoy any recognized overall hierarchical supremacy. Therefore, while in the federal 
tradition a general priority of the law of the federation over that of the federated units is recog-
nized, in multilevel constitutionalism this priority is only partial and always heavily contested. The 
rationale of this deep-going difference lies in the different roles that individuals play in the multi-
level setting, as opposed to the federal one, when it comes to the legitimation of the more inclu-
sive legal framework. Indeed, in a traditional federal system the legitimation of central public au-
thorities is guaranteed by the citizens of the federation exclusively in this function. In other words, 
insofar as they are called to give legitimacy to the central public power, the citizens of the federa-
tion suspend their status as citizens of the member states and come into action only in their politi-
cal identity related to the central unit. In doing so, they are indeed the source of two forms of le-
gitimacy – that of the federation and that of the federated state of which they are also citizens – 
but the two procedures of legitimation are strictly independent. In contrast, individuals within the 
cosmopolitan setting never suspend their status as citizens of the individual states when called to 
legitimize cosmopolitan institutions and norms. As a result, the legitimacy of cosmopolitan consti-
tutionalism is inherently twofold, coming at the same time from two distinct sources: the cosmo-
politan community and the individual states. The epistemological fundament, here, is the commu-
nicative understanding of society, according to which this is constituted by different contexts of 
interaction. The most general and inclusive among these is the one in which human beings are in-
volved transnationally and irrespective of their citizenships and belongings. In accordance with this 
understanding, world – or, to be precise, “cosmopolitan” – constitutionalism is the political project 
that aims at regulating this kind of transnational interactions with principles and rules in order to 
make them predictable, inclusive and just.62 In a multilayered and stratified, but also horizontally 
intertwined legal and institutional system, which is characterized by the non-hierarchical coexist-
ence of two legitimacy strands, conflicts between norms cannot be resolved by resorting to a pyr-
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amid of sources that is presently missing and should not be established in the future, but only 
through dialogue between institutions and, in particular, between courts.63  
The considerations about the way in which the balance between the whole and its parts 
could be guaranteed in a cosmopolitan setting lead us directly to the second main issue of global 
constitutionalism, namely to the question of the conditions under which its norms and institutions 
can be considered legitimate. In particular, we have to address the problem of what kind of legiti-
macy should be arguably envisaged in the cosmopolitan context and which mechanism can sup-
port it. Essentially, the debate offers three solutions. The first one refers to the use of the concept 
of “reasonableness”.64 Leaning on Ronald Dworkin’s work,65 Mattias Kumm introduces the notion 
with the aim to separate, in the field of cosmopolitan constitutionalism, the concept of legitimacy 
from the praxis of democracy, i.e. from the direct or indirect, but always reflexive involvement of 
all those concerned. In his view, legitimacy is sufficiently guaranteed, in cosmopolitan perspective, 
if standards of “public reasonableness” are respected. Consequently, active involvement of the cit-
izens can be substituted by the safeguard of fundamental rights as the main content of public rea-
sonableness.66 Apart from the nebulous content of the notion, it remains unclear how the centrali-
ty of “the free and equal” – also advocated by Kumm –67 can be preserved in front of such a far-
going concession to that kind of technocratic paternalism that colonizes a large part of the debate 
on governance beyond the nation state. Indeed, it is difficult to ascertain who the legitimate hold-
ers and guardians of public reasonableness should be – if not those citizens or, in general, fellow 
humans who are affected by the consequences of the decisions.  
The second solution to the question of the legitimacy of a cosmopolitan constitutional order, 
quite on the contrary, explores bottom-up forms of non-representative and inclusive empower-
ment of stakeholders, aiming at the safeguard of the social and ecological conditions of life.68 On 
the basis of the hardly contestable assumption that modern constitutionalism has been a bottom-
up political project, the purpose of this second approach basically consists in identifying chances 
for the development of locally based forms of direct democracy. The third and last solution lies 
somehow between the first and the second – though slightly more on the side of the second due 
to its specific attention to the direct involvement of citizens in guaranteeing the legitimacy of insti-
tutions and norms. Unlike both the reference to “reasonableness” – which seems to favour the in-
stitutional point of view of the international organizations – and the appeal to the worldwide and 
largely unformalized self-determination of the stakeholders, the third solution strives for a balance 
between the whole and its part in the form of a double two-tier approach. The first leg of the two-
tier approach focuses on the institutional setting of cosmopolitan constitutionalism. Taking a two-
level perspective, it assumes that cosmopolitan constitutionalism is based on two pillars: a thin 
layer of international organizations – largely comprised of institutions under the aegis of a re-
formed UN – with the limited task to protect peace and fundamental human rights,69 and the na-
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tion states which make up the international community. However, in contrast with the present 
situation and with any kind of technocratic idea of governance, both pillars should be endowed 
with adequate democratic legitimation. This implies – on the side of the whole of the international 
organization – a serious effort towards the parliamentarization of as many institutions of the in-
ternational community as possible,70 and on the other hand a no less heartfelt commitment to the 
development of democracy inside the individual states. It cannot be denied, however, that this 
sort of “dual democracy”71 is severely hampered by the undemocratic nature of many national re-
gimes: indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the institutions of the international community can be 
made more democratic if a significant number of member states violate the most fundamental 
democratic rules. Under these circumstances, the role of the democratic representation of the 
worldwide community of citizens might provisionally and putatively be taken on by a permanent 
assembly of NGOs, characterized by precise deliberative rules and unequivocally endowed with 
the right to be heard. The second leg of the two-tier approach aims at building an equilibrium be-
tween the participation of the stakeholders and the institutional competence of international or-
ganizations. Unlike the plea for a diffuse cosmopolitan direct democracy, dual democracy com-
bines two different levels: first by counterbalancing participation with representation, and second-
ly by integrating – admittedly, more openly and far-going than in the democratic nation state – the 
bottom-up source of legitimacy with the expertise and knowledge that settled over time, both na-
tionally and internationally, in the institutions of the executive power. In fact, the legitimacy of the 
international organizations is ultimately guaranteed not only by the citizens of the cosmopolitan 
community but also by its member states. 
 
 
2.4. How to Manage Transnational Legal Conflicts 
 
Transnational law is characterized by the presence of a number of horizontally coexisting legal sys-
tems which overlap with one another, while not being hierarchically bound to one another. Taken 
together, these two aspects account for both the increase of legal conflicts and – even more im-
portantly – the impossibility to resolve them by resorting to the usual procedure, namely by clari-
fying which norm or institution is superior. Thus, three substantially new strategies have been de-
veloped in order to manage transnational conflicts of law. The first one aims at creating “interface 
norms” and practices, with the essential purpose to “embrace hybridity”,72 i.e. to establish a post-
hierarchical system of mutual recognition of an almost unlimited equal normative dignity of all in-
volved legal systems, as well as of their substantial self-reliance and independence.73 This ap-
proach comprehends mechanisms like the acknowledgement of margins of appreciation74 or of 
subsidiarity schemes,75 the acceptance of “limited autonomy regimes”,76 “mutual recognition re-
gimes”,77 and “conditional recognition” – such as the Solange II decision of the German Federal 
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Constitutional Court of 1986 –78 as well as, finally, the recognition of judgements.79 This last 
mechanism – namely the recognition of judgements issued by a court belonging to a different le-
gal system – also constitutes one of the ways in which the second strategy operates. This focuses, 
indeed, on the dialogue between courts of distinct legal regimes – or, as it has been specified, on 
the “engagement with foreign precedents”, since the courts’ actions are in many cases one-sided 
and do not imply any interaction with the counterpart.80 The category comprises both the cases in 
which a domestic court (in most cases a constitutional court) refers to a decision taken by a for-
eign court (generally, also a constitutional court), and the situations in which – giving a broad 
meaning to the definition of “foreign” – a domestic court vertically interacts with a supranational 
court such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) or the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
Regarded by some as a limited and rather marginal phenomenon81 while utterly praised by others 
as a fundamental step towards a cosmopolitan jurisprudence82 and as a significant contribution 
“to enhance democracy and inclusion”,83 transnational activities of courts are undeniably growing 
in numbers and becoming increasingly influential. The third strategy makes the otherwise informal 
interaction between transnational institutions and, in particular, courts to a formalized procedure 
by establishing mechanisms of consultation and dialogue. While being the most ambitious of the 
three strategies, since it institutionalizes dialogue by making it sometimes mandatory and always 
advisable, it is – probably exactly because of its ambition – also the less broadly developed and 
applied. Basically we have, indeed, only one example as regards constitutional law – i.e. Art. 39 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa – and the same limited number of applications 
with reference to the interactions between domestic and supranational courts, namely the “pre-
liminary ruling” procedure ex Art. 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). Nonetheless, this third strategy is arguably the best way to deal with transnational con-
flicts of norms in case that we have in mind an overall system of norms and institutions which, al-
beit non-hierarchical, strives nonetheless for as much consistency as possible. 
This last remark anticipates a second question related to how transnational conflicts of 
norms are addressed, namely its most essential rationale. In other words, which are the rationali-
ties that come into play while dealing, in different forms, with conflicts of norms against a transna-
tional background? And what are their final purposes? Substantially, we can distinguish three un-
derstandings of rationality and purposes when we take up the managing of transnational conflicts 
– which, quite tellingly, correspond to the three post-unitary paradigms of social order.84 Consid-
ered from this perspective, the managing of transnational conflicts unveils the connection be-
tween legal discourse and a specific weltanschaaung, or a way to define knowledge and justify ac-
tion. The first understanding takes up the epistemology of systems theory, regardless of whether 
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explicitly or implicitly. It applies if external elements are taken into account only with the purpose 
of adapting the internal operations of one’s own legal system to the challenges coming from out-
side so as to maintain its original functional rationality. In this sense, law-making happens 
“through mutual irritation, observation and reflexivity of autonomous legal orders,”85 and the ra-
tionality of the external system is only interesting insofar as it impacts on the internal procedures. 
Instead, if the logic that inspires the interaction originates from postmodern thinking, the main 
aim of the dialogue will be the establishment of positive comity and tolerance, finally leading to a 
broad acknowledgement of foreign judgements.86 In this case, the rationality of the external sys-
tem is fully recognized as having the same value, although it is also considered incommensurably 
different since no overarching and all-encompassing rationality is assumed to be possible. Precise-
ly this kind of assumption that an overarching rationality is both arguably identifiable and desira-
ble imbues the third understanding of the rationale of transnational interaction. Indeed, if the 
epistemological background is the communicative paradigm of order, the goal of transnational in-
teraction arguably consists in the implementation of the normative contents of intersubjective ra-
tionality. Because an all-encompassing rationality is presumed to exist, its correct application 
through horizontal dialogue is likely to lead to consistent solutions of conflicts. Even though no re-
sort to top-down hierarchies is accepted, a relative normative superiority of certain legal regimes 
is nonetheless recognized, in particular when their internal contents – as in the case of human 




3. Interdisciplinarity and International Law’s Content 
 
The case against the interdisciplinarity of international law was most powerfully advocated by 
those authors who claimed that the law constitutes a self-contained and self-reliant system. Given 
this premise, the legal system may be assumed to have a truth content in itself – i.e. without any 
resort to truth sources located in extra-legal discourses – or to be a mere instrument for the reali-
zation of individual preferences, thus being devoid of any truth content. Starting with the first var-
iant – namely with the interpretation that recognizes that the law has a truth content, but denies 
that this is to be sought outside the realm of legal sentences – the first point of reference cannot 
but be Hans Kelsen’s legal philosophy.  
One of the central aims of Kelsen’s work – probably the most central at all – was the attempt 
to lay down the epistemological presuppositions for considering the legal system an object of sci-
entific research. In this sense, legal theory had to become “legal science” (Rechtswissenschaft). To 
achieve his goal, he had to find out both the specific form of legal sentences and their ultimate 
foundation, which, if legal science had to be self-sufficient, could not be sought in extra-legal dis-
ciplines, such as morals, philosophy, religion, sociology or political science. 88 As for the form of le-
gal sentences, Kelsen claimed that they are shaped as hypothetical propositions, according to the 
structure “Z = if Z1, then Z2”. In this kind of sentence, Z2 is validated by Z1, which is therefore vest-
ed with the function to act as a foundation of Z2. However, the proposition does not say anything 
about the possible foundation of Z1, so that the overall validity of Z cannot be seen as guaranteed. 
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As a result, we need a higher norm which establishes the rules for the valid production of Z. Such a 
norm has the form “if X, then Z”, where “X = if X1, then X2”. At this point, Z is validated by X and, 
within X, X2 is validated by X1; yet, once again, to find a foundation for X1 and for X as a whole, we 
have to climb a step higher, up to the norm “if Y, then X”, where “Y = if Y1, then Y2” – but only with 
the result of being confronted with the same problem as in the previous steps. Indeed, since in the 
formal pyramid of legal positivism the validity of any proposition is founded on the validity of a 
norm located at a hierarchically higher level, the whole process runs the risk of a regression ad in-
finitum, with the consequence that no reliable foundation can be established for the legal system. 
Kelsen proposed to stop the upward climbing at a certain point, at which the whole system of legal 
propositions was thought to find its last validation in what he called the “basic norm” (Grund-
norm).89 Following his view, we have to put at the last stage of our regression in the search of the 
last fundament of the legal system the proposition “if A, then B”, where “B = if B1, then B2”. What 
is remarkable, here, is that A – as the Grundnorm – does not have the usual form “if A1, then A2”. 
Indeed, in order to stop the backward process, A cannot display the structure of a hypothetical 
sentence – which would imply a further regression – but of an apodictic proposition. Put different-
ly, the “basic norm” cannot be – as legal proposition generally are – a sentence formulated and 
declared as valid on the basis of a hierarchically higher located procedure, or a lex posita. Instead 
of being a set, “posed” (gesetzt) or positive norm, it has to be, to stand on its own, a “pre-posed” 
(vorgesetzt) or presupposed assumption. Concretely, the content of the assumption at the basis of 
a legal system varies from case to case. For instance, the Grundnorm can maintain that “all power 
derives from the people”, or – quite to the contrary – that “all power derives from the monarch” 
or even from “God”; the only condition is that the pre-positive principle of the whole legal system 
has to be strong and well-accepted enough to secure effectiveness.90 
Substantially, Kelsen’s ultimate source of the validity of the legal system neither meets the 
criteria that generally characterize legal propositions, nor does its content properly belong to the 
legal discourse. Rather, it seems to take inevitably the form of a general assumption about the ex-
tra-legal – i.e. social and political, or even moral and philosophical – fundament of the “order of 
human behaviour”. On that basis, the conclusion cannot but be that the legal system is not capa-
ble of sustaining itself on its own, but requires the resort to an extra-legal content. The same prob-
lem is shared by the other major exponent of legal positivism, this time from the English-speaking 
intellectual tradition, namely H. L. A. Hart. In fact, Hart tried to avoid Kelsen’s somehow obscure 
and explicitly metalegal foundation of the legal system by introducing the notion of the “rule of 
recognition”.91 In his theory, the “rule of recognition” is understood as the principle that allows us 
to identify the context for the valid application of a certain legal norm. For example, it should ena-
ble us to “recognize” a norm as belonging to the domestic legal order or, instead, to the interna-
tional legal system, due to the fact that the norm is produced, in the first case, according to the 
rules laid down in the national constitution, or is the result, in the second case, of an inter-state 
treaty. Consequently, the “rule of recognition” is assumed to guarantee the validity of the norms 
within a specific system, while identifying their scope of application. Thus, Hart’s theory attempted 
to overcome the quite evident extra-legal connotation of Kelsen’s Grundnorm by including the 
source of validity – which was presumed to be itself a “rule” and not a general assumption – into 
the system of legal norms. Moreover, it concentrated more on the conditions for the validity of a 
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norm than on its content. However, it was Hart himself who admitted that the “rule of recogni-
tion” is lastly not a rule of the legal system in the full meaning of the term since “in the day-to-day 
life of a legal system its rule of recognition is very seldom expressly formulated as a rule.”92 If not a 
proper norm, then the “rule of recognition” must be a non-positive and in the most cases implicit 
presumption concerning the range of validity of a legal proposition, which provides “both private 
persons and officials … with authoritative criteria for identifying primary rules of obligation.”93 
From this point of view, therefore, the difference from Kelsen’s approach tends to vanish away. 
Moreover, putting “recognition” at the basis of the legal system implies that the validity of a norm 
has to be acknowledged by the social community in charge of applying it – and the acknowledge-
ment of the binding character of a normative proposition is always a social process which inevita-
bly goes far beyond the boundaries of the formal system of laws. 
Legal positivism denies interdisciplinarity by claiming that the legal system is a self-reliant hi-
erarchical set of normative propositions, characterized by a specific formal structure and an au-
tonomous truth content. This truth content has been identified, by the two main exponents of le-
gal positivism, respectively with the Grundnorm or with the “rule of recognition”. However, we 
can consistently argue that the truth content of the legal system is precisely what links it to extra-
legal discourses, thus reintroducing that element of interdisciplinarity which should have been 
purged from jurisprudence. Faced with the substantial failure of the most essential tasks under-
taken by legal positivists and with the evidence that this shortcoming is related to the truth con-
tent of the legal system as the Trojan horse of interdisciplinarity and extra-legal discourses, we 
must now turn to the question on whether a better result in favour of the self-reliance of the legal 
system could be achieved if we assume that the formalism of the law goes along with the rejection 
of any kind of truth content, be it inherent or external to the system. In other words, could a legal 
system without aspiration to possess a truth content be effectively self-sufficient, thus definitively 
silencing the request for interdisciplinarity? This is precisely the claim made by Martti Kosken-
niemi, one of the most influential legal theorists of his generation. Koskenniemi’s influences can 
essentially be traced back to three sources: the Critical Legal Studies, from which he draws the 
conviction that law is intrinsically linked to power; postmodern thinking, from which he takes up 
the idea that no universal rationality can be discovered in human knowledge and action, either in 
the law or elsewhere; and a sort of Wittgensteinian epistemology, according to which propositions 
do not have a truth content in themselves – be it intrinsic or object-related – but derive their 
meaning from the context in which they are uttered.94 Following along those intellectual paths – in 
particular the epistemological scepticism of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations – Kosken-
niemi maintains that legal norms and notions, i.e. legal propositions and their main substantive 
components, neither contain an inherent truth nor unequivocally refer to external facts.95 Having 
no rationality in its own right, the law is regarded by Koskenniemi as a set of formal sentences96 
that can be used to foster the priorities of the individual legal professionals.97 In the light of the re-
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jection of any truth content of the law, the only task of the schools of law would consist in training 
the students in the application of legal technicalities in order to acquire the instruments to push 
forwards in the best way their idiosyncratic preferences. It is almost superfluous to say that, under 
those circumstances, any reference to interdisciplinarity would be meaningless. 
Koskenniemi’s position, however, turns out to be rather unconvincing for two main rea-
sons.98 First, insofar as the law relies, for its interpretation and application, on individual convic-
tions, these are themselves something that goes beyond the formal character of legal proposi-
tions. Consequently, even if we adopt Koskenniemi’s perspective, we have to admit that the legal 
system inevitably finds its meaning in a world outside the overall set of legal norms – and this 
should always be taken into account while studying and teaching law. Secondly, the interpretation 
of legal propositions should not be considered as arbitrary as Koskenniemi is prone to assume. In 
fact, Wittgenstein’s radical idea of a language devoid of objective references and, thus, without 
falsifiable truth content never became mainstream among philosophers of language and episte-
mologists. Rather, in order to avoid a cognitive scepticism that would prove disruptive, in particu-
lar for natural sciences, and to prevent a moral neutralism that would permanently weaken the 
normative content of human sciences, the post-Wittgensteinian philosophy of language and theo-
ry of knowledge were rather committed to mend the rift and to bridge the gap between language 
and objective reality again.99 The most recent linguistic and epistemological research suggests, in-
deed, that legal propositions – as any other sort of propositions too – should be assumed to have a 
truth content that research and teaching are committed to explore accordingly.  
Yet, what is this truth content that lies at the basis of the legal system and should be proper-
ly considered while analyzing the law as well as in the context of legal education? We can get a 
first hint at a possible answer from Niklas Luhmann’s sociology of law. According to his version of 
systems theory, society necessarily differentiates itself into different social subsystems, the ra-
tionale of which is to deliver in the most efficient way the functions whose fulfillment the society 
as a whole needs in order to persist and thrive. Against this background, every social subsystem is 
characterized by its own rationality, depending on the priorities and choices of action that guaran-
tee the most effective outcome with reference to the function to be fulfilled.100 While performing 
its function, each subsystem inevitably produces expectations in those interaction participants 
who come into contact with it. In order to prevent the disruptive effects that could arise from the 
pretensions formulated by social actors, their legitimate expectations are expressed in the form of 
norms, and the claims appealing to these norms are dealt with through formal procedures follow-
ing the principles laid down by law. Therefore, law’s function lastly consists in stabilizing the nor-
mative expectations deriving from other social subsystems.101 Two further aspects are relevant 
here. First, like society is made of distinct social subsystems, also the whole of the system of legal 
norms divides itself into specialized legal subsystems, each of them typified by the task of stabiliz-
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ing the normative expectations of a specific social context. For example, we have the administra-
tive social system and, related to it, we have also a specialized administrative law; analogously, we 
have internet and the law of internet, financial markets and the law of finance, and so on. Second-
ly, every social subsystem organizes the flow of communication within its range of influence on 
the basis of its own rationality, i.e. following the rational criteria which autonomously emerge as 
the most appropriate in order to achieve the functional goal of the subsystem. To make once again 
an example, the rationality of the administration has to be different from the rationality that gov-
erns the financial markets. On that basis, every specialized legal subsystem has to make that spe-
cific rationality to its own, which shapes the flow of communication of the social subsystem whose 
normative expectations it has to regulate. 
At this point, the second argument in favour of interdisciplinarity – which is applicable not 
only to international law, but to law in general – stands out with the force of evidence: since every 
specialized system of legal norms is necessarily imbued by the very same rational principles that 
we may find in the social subsystem of reference, the analysis and teaching of law cannot refrain 
from dealing with the systemic rationalities that create the functional horizon of society. In other 
words, if we want to know why a legal subsystem operates in a certain way, then we have to be 
aware of the logics that underlie that particular flow of subsystemic communication. As a matter 
of fact, in the legal sentence “if Z1, then Z2”, the second element – namely Z2 – is determined not 
only by the formal structure of the proposition but also by the content of Z1, i.e. by the social ra-
tionale that shapes it. Resorting to an example again, the law of international organizations cannot 
be understood without knowing their rationality and operating mode. Far from being self-reliant 
as the Rechtswissenschaft wanted to believe, the law is deeply embedded in social processes. It 




4. Interdisciplinarity and Law’s Overall Social Rationale 
 
In the last section the interdisciplinary approach to legal research and education has been justified 
by referring to the essential link between the legal system and the different forms of functional ra-
tionality that characterize the social subsystems respectively regulated by the distinct legal subsys-
tems. Yet, there is a further justification, which relies on a broader and intersubjective concept of 
rationality. Indeed, beyond functional rationality, which focuses on the instruments and proce-
dures that make possible to fulfil fundamental social services in the most efficient way, we can de-
tect a non-systemic or supra-systemic rationality, the task of which consists in determining the 
conditions for the social life as a whole to be considered ethically justifiable. In other words, the 
supra-systemic rationality is shaped, in epistemological terms, by the intersubjective exchange of 
arguments about what a “good social life” is assumed to be. At the basis of the “good social life” 
are rules which are considered ethically qualified and advantageous by a sufficiently large part of 
the members of the community. Since the law plays a major role – at least in modern societies – in 
defining those rules, we can infer that the system of legal norms is directly connected to the way 
in which the idea of the “good life” is understood in a specific society.  
 
 
4.1. Paradigms of Order and Paradigmatic Revolutions 
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To clarify the content of the legal system, we have to address the question of the overall rationali-
ty that imbues the society whose interactions are regulated by that system. However, we can only 
undertake this task if we can rely on a notion that enables us to build a conceptual bridge between 
the two dimensions, i.e. between the system of norms and social rationality. I claim that this role 
is to be taken up by the notion of order. “Order” is the condition in which social interactions are 
effectively directed by rules that make them predictable, peaceful and, in the most favourable 
cases, also cooperative. On that basis, the connection between the concept of “order” and the 
first of the above-mentioned dimensions – namely, norms in general, as well as legal norms in par-
ticular – is quite immediate. Yet, the notion of “order” also has a normative qualification: to be ac-
cepted, the norms that create the “ordered society” must correspond to the predominant idea of 
what a social and political community assumes to be a “good social life”. Put differently, the “or-
dered society”, to persist and thrive, has to qualify as a “well-ordered society” in the eyes of the 
majority of its members. We have, here, the connection of “order” with the second above-
mentioned dimension, i.e. with a general idea of social rationality. Indeed, we can detect different 
ideas of social rationality and, therefore, as many conceptions of the “well-ordered society” as 
well as of the legal system based on it. We can draw a map of the distinct understandings of “or-
der” by resorting to the essential components of any idea of “order”. I will come back to this point 
in short. But, first, it is important to pay attention to the further advantages that can be derived 
from the use of the notion of “order”. 
Beside the advantage of building a bridge between the legal system and overall social ra-
tionality, the concept of “order” can be applied – secondly – to a very large number of social, polit-
ical, legal and economic institutions, making possible to find out at a very abstract level the invari-
ables that bind them, or the differences that divide them. This aspect is of paramount importance 
in a time in which, as it has been highlighted above,102 the traditional distinctions – such as be-
tween public and private, national and international, and so on – are increasingly blurred and ur-
gently need a redefinition. A third advantage in using the concept of “order” is connected to the 
relation between the different disciplines of human science. Although they are, to a certain extent, 
all correlated to each other, and often share a common origin, they have been suffering, in the last 
decades, from a loss of mutual communication. Yet, dialogue allows the transfer of knowledge de-
riving from related sciences into the language of one’s own discipline, improving this way also the 
research results in this field. This leads to the third argument in favour of interdisciplinarity in legal 
research and education – once again an argument that is not limited to international law, but can 
be expanded to law in general. In fact, legal theory – but also legal praxis, to some extent – can 
highly benefit from the knowledge developed by political science, sociology, economy and political 
theory. More concretely, the engagement with non-legal discourses, often due to their more inno-
vative approaches, helps legal professionals to better understand the society in which law oper-
ates. This process does not have only a practical dimension – in the sense that enables legal pro-
fessionals to be more successful because of their more profound understanding of the reality – but 
also makes it possible for the law and for those who work with it to become self-reflexive inas-
much as the legal discourse and the preferences of those who use it can be located against a more 
ambitious background regarding how the society as a whole should be organized. Interdisciplinary 
dialogue, however, needs some conceptual elements in common, which build the bridges of 
communication and guarantee that the scholars on each side have a chance to understand each 
other. The notion of “order” is one of such conceptual bridges. Indeed, “order” is a concept that is 
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familiar to philosophers and political scientists, lawyers and sociologists, theologians and econo-
mists – and some other categories of experts of human sciences could be added. 
We can detect, in the history of human thought, different ideas of the “well-ordered socie-
ty”. I propose to define them as the paradigms of order.103 More specifically, a “paradigm of or-
der” is a set of concepts and abstract claims as definitions of those concepts, which shape, accord-
ing to certain parameters, the contours of what a “well-ordered society” is assumed to be. These 
parameters correspond to three claims regarding how a well-ordered social interaction should be 
organized, which are necessarily contained in every paradigm of order. The first claim addresses 
the extension of order, namely whether this is inevitably limited to a homogeneous social com-
munity, or can potentially be extended to the whole humankind. The second claim is related to the 
ontological foundation of order, i.e. whether some kind of organic community builds the basis of 
social order, or rather the individuals are at the centre of society. The third claim, finally, is about 
whether a well-ordered society has to be necessarily unitary and hierarchical, with no overlapping 
and horizontal interaction of norms and institutions, or a pluralist society with an heterarchical 
normative and institutional system can also be seen as “well-ordered”.  
To use a metaphor, we always see the world – and the possible actions that we can carry out 
in it – through the glasses that the specific culture of that time puts at our disposal. But, glasses 
must be changed over time. And paradigms change, too. This happens through what we can call 
paradigmatic revolutions. A “paradigmatic revolution” is a huge change of perspective – or, to put 
more correctly, of the conceptual pre-conditions of knowledge and action – following which our 
understanding of the world and of the possibility to act in it is profoundly reshaped. We see the 
world differently, we explain phenomena differently, and we discover new chances for our activi-
ties. Put very simply, we get a new idea of what is true and what is right. If applied to the patterns 
of social order, this means that in every period of human history our understanding of the “well-
ordered society” has been shaped by a sufficiently coherent vision containing assumption on all 
three above-mentioned claims. However, when social changes occurred, making some of those as-
sumptions obsolete, a new paradigm eventually emerged, which was better suited to the new sit-
uation, in the sense that it provided a more useful conceptual instrument to understand it and 
more valuable advice for action. Nevertheless, paradigms of social order – contrary to the para-
digms of natural sciences – seem never to die, but only to spend times, even long periods, of re-
covery, just to reappear in a shape which is thought to be more adequate to meet the challenges 
of the new era. As a result, even the most ancient paradigms of order are still present in our time, 
offering an interpretation of society that, even though to some extent old-fashioned, is still capa-
ble of deeply influencing the debate. 
 
 
4.2. The Unitary Paradigms of Order 
 
Going through the history of political thought, we become aware of the presence of three histori-
cal paradigms of order, characterized by an evolution that lasted many hundred – or even a few 
thousand – years. Furthermore, we can detect three more recent paradigms, which developed on-
ly a couple of decades ago as a result of the last paradigmatic revolution. The most ancient of all 
paradigms of order maintains – with reference to the claims that essentially characterize each 
paradigm of order – that, first, a well-ordered society cannot but be limited in range, while be-
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tween limited well-ordered communities only limitation of dis-order is feasible. Thus, it is particu-
laristic and not universalistic. Secondly, its supporters generally assume that a community, to be 
well-ordered, must be largely homogeneous, i.e. a holon. Accordingly, the first paradigm of order 
is holistic and not individualistic. Thirdly, the well-ordered society must be organized as a unitary 
structure, as opposed to a pluralist one, since it is not accepted that conflicting norms and institu-
tions of different origins can be valid or have authority at the same time and in the same place. 
The basic assumptions of this first paradigm of order – which we can call holistic particularism – 
were already laid down for the first time in the Western history of ideas as far back in time as in 
ancient Greece,104 to pass then through different stages of development, determined by the re-
spective predominance of concepts such as territorial sovereignty,105 national identity106 and con-
tinental hegemony.107 
The first paradigmatic revolution addressed the content of the first assertion that distin-
guishes every paradigm of order, namely the assertion concerning the extension of order. That 
means that conceptions of order were developed, for the first time, according to which the well-
ordered society can extend so far as to comprise the entire humankind. This marked the transition 
from a particularistic to a universalistic understanding of order. Nothing changed, on the contrary, 
as regards the other contents of the paradigm: social order was still based on the assumption of 
an organic ontological fundament, and order had to be unitary. Due to its characteristics, this sec-
ond paradigm of order can be defined as holistic universalism. Probably, the idea that order can be 
universal was formulated for the first time in the Buddhist philosophy through the concept of 
dharma.108 In the Western world, instead, it was the Stoic philosophy that took this step.109 Later, 
Stoic universalism was taken up by the upcoming Christian philosophy.110 In fact, the idea of order 
of Christianity is, in principle, universalistic, since the message of the Gospel is directed to all hu-
man beings. Yet, a significant problem arose with Christian universalism: indeed, if the universality 
of social, political and legal order is grounded on religion, there is an undeniable threat of discrim-
ination, or even of persecution of the “infidels”, who are actually excluded from the order of 
peace.111 Thus, given that the religion-based universalism is always curtailed and incomplete, the 
attempt was made – in particular by thinkers influenced by the theology of Reformation – to 
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ground holistic universalism on purely rational arguments.112 Interestingly, to avoid religion-based 
biases, they justified the possibility to establish a cosmopolitan social order by resorting to an old 
Stoic argument, namely to the areligious and allegedly purely rational assumption of the universal 
sociability of humans. In continuity with the past, the belief in the holistic, universalistic and uni-
tary essence of social rationality is still a defining character of contemporary natural law theory.113 
The third paradigm of order was the result of the second paradigmatic revolution, which did 
not affect – like the first one – the extension of order, but what had to be regarded as the ontolog-
ical basis of the “well-ordered society”. In the first two paradigms of order this ontological basis 
was always holistic or organic, in the sense that a community (of more or less broad extension) 
was assumed to exist which was regarded as axiologically superior to the sum of all its members. 
Put in a simpler way, the totality of the community was located above the individuals. It was 
Thomas Hobbes who took the first step on the way to the paradigmatic revolution from holism to 
individualism in political philosophy. In his view, the logical starting point of social order was not 
the existing community, but the individuals with their endowment of rights, reason and interests. 
With the second paradigmatic revolution the hierarchy was thus reversed: the individuals were lo-
cated above the community, which was presumed to exist only on the basis of their free act of will 
and in order to protect their rights.114 Accordingly, society was established by a contract stipulated 
by free and equal individuals – whence the definition of this strand of political philosophy as con-
tractualism. Depending on how many rights the individuals, then united to form a society, agreed 
to transfer to the public power that had been created by the contract, the individualistic paradigm 
of order developed into two different strands: liberal contractualism, in which only the right to 
persecute offenders is handed over to the public power and the parliament is entrusted with 
strong legislative and control competences;115 and democratic contractualism, in which actually all 
rights are alienated, yet not to the institutions of public power, but to the citizens themselves as a 
whole, who are now joined to form a political community.116  
At first, the supporters of the individualistic paradigm of order had little interest in interna-
tional relations, so that the question regarding how this paradigm dealt with the extension of or-
der remained unanswered for long time. However, since the individualistic paradigm put at the 
centre of its idea of order the individuals with their most abstract features – i.e. as holders of 
rights, interests and reason –, it is difficult to imagine how limits could be set to the extension of 
the well-ordered society. As a result, individualism is implicitly universalistic, so that we can 
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properly define the third paradigm of social order as universalistic individualism. The first author 
who became aware of the intrinsically cosmopolitan nature of individualism was Immanuel Kant. 
Indeed, he not only upheld the idea of the centrality of the individuals in his understanding of so-
cial, political and legal order but also explicitly took position in favour of a cosmopolitan frame-
work for order. More specifically, he introduced for the first time a cosmopolitan law (jus cosmo-
politicum) as one of the three parts of public law – along with state law (constitutional law, espe-
cially) and traditional international law (jus gentium).117 While traditional international law is a le-
gal framework that governs the relations among states, cosmopolitan law is supra-state law. More 
than a century after Kant, Hans Kelsen drew the most radical consequence from the idea of cos-
mopolitan law by locating international law – and in particular that part of it which has erga omnes 
validity – at the top of his still rigorously unitary and hierarchical system of legal norms.118 His le-
gally shaped civitas maxima can be regarded as the most ambitious blueprint for a strongly cen-
tralized cosmopolitan order centred on the priority of individual rights.  
 
 
4.3. The Post-unitary or Pluralist Paradigms of Order 
 
The third paradigmatic revolution involved what has been described as the third element that is 
always present in a paradigm of order, namely the assertion concerning the unitary or non-unitary 
character of a well-ordered society. Regardless of whether they were particularistic or universalis-
tic on the one hand, holistic or individualistic on the other, the paradigms of order before the third 
paradigmatic revolutions were all characterized by a unitary idea of order. This means that, in all 
these previous paradigms, the institutional structure and the system of norms are considered 
“well-ordered” only if they are organized as coherent, vertical and hierarchical unity, as a pyramid 
in which conflicts between different institutions and norms have to be resolved by defining which 
institution or norm, respectively, has priority over the conflicting one. Instead, the third paradig-
matic revolution has paved the way for an understanding of order in which the well-ordered socie-
ty is conceived of as a polyarchic, horizontal and interconnected structure that reminds us more of 
a network than of a pyramid. In this social, political and legal configuration of interrelated deci-
sion-makers, conflicts of institutions and norms are not a dangerous threat for order; rather, they 
can be operationalized in discursive procedures aiming at reaching consent and not at establishing 
– or re-establishing – hierarchies. 
The first contemporary post-unitary paradigm of order is based on the epistemological ap-
proach of systems theory and has already been introduced before while addressing the question of 
the truth content of the specialized legal subsystems.119 Resuming its main conceptual tenet, it 
can concisely be said that, insofar as the law has the function to guarantee the internal order of 
different social subsystems, the legal system itself loses its unity and develops distinct legal sub-
systems, each of them characterized by the rationality, expressed in legal terms, that underlies the 
implementation of the subsystemic functions.  
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The second post-unitary paradigm of order has essentially developed as a result of the scep-
tical philosophy of language of the later Wittgenstein120 and, even more, as a consequence of the 
transfer of Michel Foucault’s postmodern critical approach into political philosophy and legal sci-
ence. The explicit target of postmodern criticism is the modern concept of subjectivity, as ex-
pressed by the context of the universalistic-individualistic paradigm.121 In particular, the modern 
subject is accused to be nothing less than an artificial construct imposed to constrain human expe-
rience and action capabilities into a forced and oppressive unity. Therefore, actual human individ-
ualities have to realize themselves beyond the boundaries of a unitary – and lastly tyrannical – 
idea of order, enforced by a diffuse power aiming at the full control over bodies and minds. The 
specific feature of the paradigm of order that derives from the postmodern criticism of modern 
individualism, consists in the assumption – made, in such explicit terms and with such a large in-
fluence, for the first time in Western thinking – that order, in the sense of rules that the society in 
its totality has to follow, is in principle a threat to the self-realization of the concrete individuali-
ties. At this point, two different strands of the postmodern approach develop, both applying the 
critical look at the world of social, political and legal interactions. The first variant picks up the 
most radical interpretation of postmodern criticism, maintaining that, insofar as order is in its es-
sence oppressive, the only possibility to make the society more “human” would consist in oppos-
ing, if necessary with violence, the established rules and in substituting them with spontaneous 
form of self-expression of subjectivity. The second variant is by far less extreme and relies on the 
more moderate dimension of postmodern critical analysis of the modern society: order in its abso-
luteness remains threatening, but it does not need to be radically denied and subverted. Rather, it 
has just to be de-structured as a whole and split into a plurality of orders – in plural. Given the 
context of plurality, order loses its all-embracing, tyrannical comprehensiveness, and the individu-
als gain a new and better chance to realize their plans according to their priorities in the spaces 
generated by the break of the former rigid texture.  
According to the communicative paradigm as the third post-unitary paradigm of order, soci-
ety is made of a plurality of interactions, each of them characterized by a specific aim that influ-
ences decisively the discursive contents of the interaction.122 Yet, although the aim of the social 
interaction is essential to determine the contents of the discourse, the rationality embodied in the 
communication is, from the perspective of the communicative paradigm, not exclusively and even 
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not primarily functional.123 Rather, the communicative rationality – right from the understanding 
of communication that is here presupposed – has always a normative core.124 Precisely this nor-
mative core is what makes communicative rationality universal – and therefore different from the 
purely systemic rationalities. As regards the legal system, communicative rationality paves the way 
to a conception in which the manifold articulation of the legal system is recognized, but in a quite 
different way than in the post-unitary approaches described before. Here, plurality is embedded 
into an overarching structure, held together by the implementation of communicative reason as a 
counterpart of systemic rationality – a counterpart that is operating not only from outside the so-
cial subsystems but also inside each of them.  
 
 
4.4. How to Locate the Concepts of Legal Theory within the Context of the Paradigms of Order 
 
Drawing the map of the paradigms of order enables us to understand which social rationality lies 
at the basis of a system of legal norms as well as of the most relevant legal concepts. Furthermore, 
it allows us to recognize the reasons why a concept has changed its meaning during time in order 
to adapt to the way in which the “well-ordered society” was then conceived. Finally, it makes it 
easier to identify similarities – or differences – between concepts insofar as their contents refer to 
the same paradigms or to different ideas of order. Let us make some examples of how the proce-
dure works. 
a) Originally, the concept of sovereignty was undoubtedly part of the conceptual construct of 
holistic particularism inasmuch as it reinforced the idea that political power had to be necessarily 
hierarchical, organic and limited in extension. To some extent, this interpretation – though partial-
ly softened – is still influential.125 However, the transition to the individualistic paradigm – and 
therefore to the idea that individuals have to be put at the centre of the political community – also 
transformed the notion of sovereign power in the sense that, from then on, this had to be under-
stood as “power of the people”, or “popular sovereignty”. Moreover, the emergence of a univer-
salistic conception of order requires from sovereign powers to qualify as “trustees of humani-
ty”.126 In addition, the turn to pluralism introduced the possibility to conceive of sovereignty as a 
multilayered structure, in which the identity of the single polity coexists with cosmopolitan re-
sponsibility.127 
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b) The second pillar of holistic particularism is the conviction of the central importance of 
national identity.128 While some authors still maintain that national identity is the bulwark of con-
stitutionalism,129 the supporters of any conception of social order beyond holistic particularism 
claim that we have entered a post-national constellation – which they explicitly welcome as an 
important step towards the realization of international peace and social justice.130 
c) A further support for holistic particularism originates from religious identity, which is seen 
by some as the ideological element that can weld together social communities more diverse and 
larger than nations, while preparing them for the inevitable existential struggle against other, simi-
larly shaped communities.131 Yet, from a universalistic point of view the very same religious faith 
can undertake the opposite task, i.e. it can contribute to forge a cosmopolitan sense of solidari-
ty.132 
d) The fourth and last conceptual instrument of holistic universalism is the application of the 
theory of rational choice to international law and relations, according to which only selfish prefer-
ences of national states are rationally justifiable.133 However, if we adopt any other understanding 
of rational behaviour – which does not regard behaviour as rational inasmuch as it increases par-
ticularistic payoffs, but rather insofar as it aims, for example, at reaching the largest possible con-
sensus – then the most rational option will take the shape of the strengthening of international 
cooperation.134 
e) The claim of the contemporary Lex mercatoria to be a self-reliant subsystem of legal 
norms is much better understandable if we become aware of the social rationality on which it is 
grounded, namely systems theory.135 Indeed, since each subsystem – characterized by a specific 
functional rationality – is self-referential and independent of the environment made by all other 
subsystems, it is possible to conceive of the corpus of norms that regulates the interaction of pri-
vate economic agents as a self-regulating order, and therefore as an autonomous paradigm of or-
der. From the perspective of communicative rationality, on the contrary, the self-reliance of the 
Lex mercatoria appears to be quite questionable.136 
f) Legal pluralism137 and global governance138 are expressions of the postmodern idea of so-
cial rationality since both of them reject – explicitly in the first case, implicitly in the second – the 
existence of an all-encompassing suprasystemic rationality. However, they are subject to criticism 
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not only from the supporters of the communicative rationality: indeed, from the point of view of 
the non-pluralist conception of rationality, both approaches are simply undermining the true 
meaning of law as the manifestation of a particularistic sovereign power.139 
g) In its most radical variant, postmodern thinking radically dismisses the very idea of social 
order as a positive phenomenon – at least in the form in which we have traditionally known it – 
denouncing it as an instrument of the diffuse oppression that characterizes the “society of con-
trol”.140 Some other authors use the postmodern deconstruction of modern subjectivity, as the 
bulwark of a centralized, Western-biased, patriarchal and ultimately authoritarian notion of the 
“well-ordered society”, not to reject order entirely, but to restructure it so as to make it more re-
ceptive to the claims raised by non-Western scholars141 and feminist theorists.142 
h) Cosmopolitan constitutionalism is a central goal of all universalistic paradigms of order. 
Nonetheless, we can detect different proposals with quite distinct features, depending on their re-
spective epistemological background. Authors who can be led back to holistic universalism, for ex-
ample, tend to assume a natural law fundament for world constitutionalism, implicitly refer to an 
alleged sociability of all humans, which would urge them to build a universal community of shared 
values and interests, and finally assign to the international judiciary the most relevant role in de-
fending world order.143 On the contrary, individualistic universalism puts – in Kant’s and Kelsen’s 
vein – individual rights and freedom of agency at the centre, without postulating any kind of pre-
determined universal community which would pre-exist the legal shaping of world order.144 The 
universalism of the communicative paradigm, lastly, takes the pluralist turn into due account by 
locating cosmopolitan cosmopolitanism into a multilayered setting.145 Furthermore, it emphasizes 
– much more than its holistic counterpart – the necessity of an adequate democratic legitimacy of 
cosmopolitan institutions.146 
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5. Conclusion: The Roads to Interdisciplinarity 
 
The analysis has shown that, to understand the legal phenomenon in our times and to keep pace 
with it, the interdisciplinary approach to the law with its many disciplines should be developed 
along three main lines. The first dimension of interdisciplinarity is internal to the law and refers to 
the overlapping of the different legal disciplines in the context of law’s transnationalization. The 
second refers to the extra-legal rationality that impacts upon legal norms which regulate specific 
social interactions. The third dimension of interdisciplinarity finally connects legal subsystems to 
broader ideas of the “well-ordered society” and, through these, to extra-legal knowledge. Opening 
up to interdisciplinarity does not mean that the positive and unique contents of legal disciplines 
should be neglected in research and teaching. Rather, it implies that their analysis in scholarly 
works has to be integrated by a more focused attention on transnational law and on how, in that 
context, specialized legal disciplines interact with one another. Furthermore, on a more theoreti-
cal level, the ways should be explored in which the positive contents of legal disciplines are im-
bued by the functional rationalities of the social subsystems to which they are related, as well as 
by the suprasystemic claims about how a “well-ordered society” is assumed to look like. All this 
knowledge has to be transferred, then, into didactics through the establishment of both mandato-
ry and optional courses within law schools. In the end, the practical changes would affect the re-
search agenda of legal scholars and the curricula of law students rather peripherally, since the 
core of legal research and teaching would largely remain the same. Yet, the beneficial effects of 
such a quite limited move would be anything but irrelevant: by taking up the challenge of interdis-
ciplinarity, in fact, legal research and teaching would prove their capacity to take the most recent 
social developments into account, while being self-aware of the social role of legal norms as well 
as of how this is re-adjusting in a rapidly changing world. 
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